Immunity and Subsequent Informal Punishment by Troupis, James R.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 69
Issue 3 Fall Article 5
Fall 1978
Immunity and Subsequent Informal Punishment
James R. Troupis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
James R. Troupis, Immunity and Subsequent Informal Punishment, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 322 (1978)
9901-4169/78/6903-0322S0.200/0
TiE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 69, No. 3
Copyright © 1978 by Northwestern University School of Law Pinted in U.S.A.
COMMENTS
IMMUNITY AND SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL PUNISHMENT
Immunity is one of the many tools utilized by
federal and state prosecutors to construct the case
against a defendant. There has been a meteoric
increase in its use over the last five years and
consequently the potential standards and ramifi-
cations of immunity have often been discussed.2
While the authority to grant immunity is created
by statute,3 federal legislatures have not extended
I Requests for immunity have risen from 702 in 1971
to 1535 in 1975. The requests covered 2591 persons in
1971 and 3383 in 1975. These statistics represent only
grants of federal immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970)
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-04 (1970). Wolfson,
Immunity-How it Works in Real Life, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C.
167, 169 (1976).
2 See Symposium: Witness Immunity, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C.
129 (1976); Skinner, Immunity Right or Wrong? Right!, 47
CHI. B. REc. 168 (1976); Wolfson, .Immunity, Right or
Wrong? Wrong!, 57 CHI. B. REc. 174 (1976); Comment,
Constitutional Law: Immunity, the Dilemma of "Transactional"
versus "Use", 25 OKIA. L. Rev. 109 (1972); Comment,
What Price Immunity? The Pressing Need for Protection Against
the Abuse of Immunity Grants, 3 U.S.F.V.L. REV. 83 (1974);
Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony:
Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV.
470 (1974); Casenote, Use and Derivative Use Immunity: A
Sufficient Substitute For the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
26 ARK. L. REv. 580 (1973); Comment, Federal Immunity
Statutes and the Fifth Amendment-Fresh Beginning or False
Start?, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1973); Comment, The End
of Transactional Immunity: A Rip in Our Constitutional Fabric,
42 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 258 (1973); Criminal
Procedure-Immunity: Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination Eclipsed by Use Immunity, 48 WASH. L. REV.
711 (1973).
3 The relevant federal statutes provide:
§ 6001. Definitions.
As used in this part-
(1) "agency of the United States" means any
executive department as defined in section 101 of
title 5, United States Code, a military department
as defined in section 102 of title 5, United States
Code, the Atomic Energy Commission, the China
Trade Act registrar appointed under 53 Stat. 1432
(15 U.S.C. sec. 143), the Civil Aeronautics Board,
the Federal Communications Commission, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Maritime Commission, the Federal Power Commis-
sion, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the National Transportation Safety
Board, the Railroad Retirement Board, an arbitra-
tion board established under 48 Stat. 1193 (45
U.S.C. sec. 157), the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Subversive Activities Control Board, or
a board established under 49 Stat. 31 (15 U.S.C.
sec. 715d);
(2) "other information" includes any book, paper,
document, record, recording, or other material;
(3) "proceeding before an agency of the United
States" means any proceeding before such an
agency with respect to which it is authorized to issue
subpenas and to take testimony or receive other
information from witnesses under oath; and
(4) "court of the United States" means any of the
following courts: the Supreme Court of the United
States, a United States court of appeals, a United
States district court established under chapter 5,
title 28, United States Code, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals, the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, the District Court of Guam,
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United
States Court of Claims, the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, the Tax Court of the
United States, the Customs Court, and the Court of
Military Appeals
(added Pub. L. 91-452, title II, § 201(a), Oct. 15,
1970, 84 Stat. 926.)
§ 6002. Immunity generally.
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or pro-
vide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee
of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcom-
mittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding com-
municates to the witness an order issued under this
part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrim-
ination; but no testimony or other information com-
pelled under the order (or any information directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giv-
ing a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order. (Added Pub. L. 91-452, title II, §
201(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 927.)
§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings.
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or
may be called to testify or provide other information
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at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of
the United States or a grand jury of the United
States, the United States district court for the judi-
cial district in which the proceeding is or may be
held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b)
of this section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring such
individual to give testimony or provide other infor-
mation which he refuses to give or provide on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such
order to become effective as provided in section
6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attor-
ney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of
this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
(Added Pub. L. 91-452, title II, § 201(a), Oct. 15,
1970, 84 Stat. 927)
§ 6004. Certain administrative proceedings.
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or
who may be called to testify or provide other infor-
mation at any proceeding before an agency of the
United States, the agency may, with the approval
of the Attorney General, issue, in accordance with
subsection (b)'of this section, an order requiring the
individual to give testimony or provide other infor-
mation which he refuses to give or provide on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such
order to become effective as provided in section
6002 of this part.
(b) An agency of the United States may issue an
order under subsection (a) of this section only if in
its judgment-
(1) the testimony 9r other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
§ 6005. Congressional proceedings.
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or
may be called to testify or provide other information
at any proceeding before either House of Congress,
or any committee, or any subcommittee of either
House, or any joint committee of the two Houses, a
United States district court shall issue, in accord-
ance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the
request of a duly authorized representative of the
House of Congress or the committee concerned, an
order requiring such individual to give testimony or
provide other information which he refuses to give
or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as
provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) Before issuing an order under subsection (a)
of this section, a United States district court shall
find that-
the protection of immunity beyond the minimum
level required by the fifth amendment. 4 As a result,
the constitutional guarantee that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself"6 protects the witness from any
direct or derivative use of his testimony in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution.6 Such a standard
"prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using
the compelled testimony in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to
the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. 7
Recently, the protection against infliction of
penalties8 has not been construed to forbid the
(1) in the case of a proceeding before either
House of Congress, the request for such an order
has been approved by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the Members present of that House;
(2) in the case of a proceeding before a com-
mittee or a subcommittee of either House of
Congress or a joint committee of both Houses,
the request for such an order has been approved
by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the full committee; and
(3) ten days or more prior to the day on which
the request for such an order was made, the
Attorney General was served with notice of an
intention to request the order.
(c) Upon application of the Attorney General,
the United States district court shall defer the issu-
ance of any order under subsection (a) of this section
for such period, not longer than twenty days from
the date of the request for such order, as the Attor-
ney General may specify. (Added Pub. L. 91-452,
title II, § 201 (a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat.928.)
"18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-04.
There are numerous federal decisions holding that a
court may not, on its own initiative grant immunity. See
Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(Opinion by Burger, Circuit Judge), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
921 (1967); See also In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th
Cir. 1977), U.S. cert. denied; United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1976), U.S. cert. denied;
United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1080-82 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 946 (1976); United States v.
Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, n. 115 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The function performed by the court in approving
grants of immunity is purely ministerial. The court action
insures that the statutory procedures have been complied
with. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-33
(1956); United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535, 548
(1977) (cases cited therein).
4 In re Daley, 549 F.2d at 477.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
A full discussion of use/derivative use accompanies notes
13-28 in the text.7 Id. at 453.
"The requirement that testimony gleaned from an
immunity grant not be used in subsequent criminal
prosecutions of the immunized witness 'originated in
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). A full discussion
accompanies notes 32-66 in the text.
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disbarment of attorneys who have provided infor-
mation of their own wrongdoing while testifying
under grants of immunity.9 Though this result was
characterized as "inexorable,"' because the dis-
barment action is not a criminal proceeding, a
serious question can be raised regarding these re-
cent decisions as well as the underlying doctrine.
This comment analyzes the historical basis for
the criminal penalty doctrine and identifies the
problems inherent in its application to non-crimi-
nal proceedings. Then, it considers the use of im-
munized testimony in disbarment proceedings nd
concludes that, even assuming the viability of the
criminal penalty doctrine, the use of immunized
testimony may be prohibited because the result of
the proceeding is a criminal penalty. Finally, the
comment considers the potential extensions of pres-
ent fifth amendment law into government licensure
and contracting, and demonstrates that the use of
immunized testimony in non-criminal proceedings
has far-reaching implications.
THE ORIGINS OF THE CRIMINAL PENALTY RULE
The restrictions imposed on those seeking testi-
mony from an immunized witness derive from the
fifth amendment's admonishment that a person
shall not be required to be a witness against him-
self. This general admonition has resulted in two
primary constitutional limitations on grants of im-
munity. First, the testimony may not be used di-
rectly or derivatively." Second, the use and deriv-
ative use standard applies only to subsequent crim-
inal proceedings.'
2
In Kastigar v. United States'3 the Court set out the
9 In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), U.S. cert.
denied. See also In the Matter of Anonymous Attorneys, 41
N.Y.2d 506 (1977); Segreti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878,
544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976); Maryland State
Bar Association, Inc. v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 329
A.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975): Committee
on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Graziani,
200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974): In re Schwarz, 51 111. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972). Matter of Ungar, 27
App. Div. 2d 925, 282 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1967), appeal denied,
20 N.Y.2d 642, 229 N.E.2d 236, 282 N.Y.S.2d 1026, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967); In re Selig, 32 App. Div. 2d
213, 302 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1969); Arnett v. State, 304 S.W.2d
386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
1 In re Daley. 549 F.2d at 482 (Pell, Circuit Judge,
concurring).
x' Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 453.
IS Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896).
" 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
modern requirement against direct or derivative
use of immunized testimony. As the Court stated:
[I]mmunity from use and derivative use is coexten-
sive with the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel
testimony over a claim of the privilege .... It
prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using
the compelled testimony in any respect, and it there-
fore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. 4
The appellant in Kastigar had been found guilty of
contempt after refusing to give grand jury testi-
mony under a grant of immunity.' 5 He argued that
the grant of immunity was not coextensive with his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.' 6
In his view only a grant of "transactional" immu-.
nity under Counselman v. Hitchcock,'7 would be con-
stitutionally sufficient to require his testimony. In
Counselman, the Court had held that an immunity
statute "must afford absolute immunity against
future prosecution for the offence to which the
question relates."' 8 The Counselman Court had rea-
soned that the fifth amendment required the gov-
ernment to guarantee that no use would be made
of the testimony given, and the only method to
achieve that result was thought to be full transac-
tional immunity.'
9
Although the Kastigar Court did not explicitly
overrule Counselman, it felt that the underlying prin-
ciple there did not require more than use immu-
nity. It reasoned that the witness could be protected
from self-incrimination so long as the applicable
standard prohibited use or derivative use of the testi-
mony.2' In other words, the Court held that the
prosecution could not utilize the testimony even
for leads in possible crimes committed by the ac-
cused. The witness only could be prosecuted for
the activities he testified about if the prosecution
was not tainted by the government's use of the
immunized testimony.2 ' Had the "transactional
14 Id. at 453 (footnotes omitted).
15 Id. at 442.
161Id.
17 142 U.S. 547 (1892). "Transactional immunity" is
immunity from any prosecution that involves crimes
testified to during the course of one's immunized testi-
mony.8 Id. at 586, quoted in Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. at 451.
"9 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See
also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 467-71 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
20 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.2' The Government is held to a very high burden of
proof to show that an immunized witness's former testi-
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immunity" standard been adopted, the immunized
witness could not have been prosecuted for any
part of the occurrence about which he had testi-
fied.22
The dissenting opinions in Kastigar, written by
Justice Douglas23 and Justice Marshall,24 urged
that use immunity did not meet fifth amendment
guarantees. While Justice Douglas argued that the
fifth amendment protected the witness from con-
fessing any crime,25 Justice Marshall took issue
with the premise of the majority opinion that the
prosecution could be kept from using the testimony
as a lead to further incriminating evidence. Justice
Marshall noted that a use immunity standard was
dependent on good faith disclosure by the prose-
cution of what was discovered prior to the immu-
26
nized testimony. Even assuming the prosecutor's
good faith, there may be no method of detecting
what use was made of immunized testimony in an
office of several hundred investigators.27 In Justice
Marshall's view, the risk that ii defendant's fifth
amendment rights would be violated was too great.
There is a second, and often overlooked element
that shapes immunity grants. 2s A grant of immu-
mony has not been used to ferret-out the wrongdoing
charged in an indictment. Id. at 461-62.
22 Id at 462.
2 Id. at 462-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting).24 1d. at 467-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
251d at 467 (Douglas, J. dissenting).26 Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28 On other occasions, the Court has recognized that
the fifth amendment's protection must be broad in scope.
For example, the use of immunized testimony within
constitutional limitations is not affected by crossing juris-
dictional boundaries. Prior to Kastigar, the Court had
resolved this issue. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n.,
378 U.S. 526 (1964), the petitioners had been found in
civil contempt for refusing to testify though they were
granted immunity by the state prosecutor. Murphy noted
that if he did testify, that testimony could be used against
him in federal proceedings. The Supreme Court, with
Justice Goldberg writing the opinion, ruled that the state
immunity must protect the witness from any subsequent
criminal prosecutions, regardless of the jurisdiction. If the
immunity did not protect the witness from all subsequent
criminal prosecutions, it would not be coextensive with
the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 78. The Court
overturned two prior cases, United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931), and Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944), in holding that the immunity grant
must stretch across state and federal sovereignties.
Similarly, the Court has taken steps to insure that a
witness's refusal to testify will not lead to adverse impli-
cations of guilt. In Slochower v. Board of Education, 350
U.S. 551 (1956), a school teacher was fired for refusing to
testify before Congress. The Court held that invocation
of the fifth amendment privilege could not be considered
nity extends only to criminal prosecutions. The privi-
lege established by the United States immunity
statutes, like so much of American law, appears to
have originated in England. As it originally devel-
oped, the privilege had two elements-a privilege
against infamy and a privilege against criminal
use.2 To disgrace one's name, and therefore one's
family, was a devastating consequence of any crim-
inal act.30 As an adjunct to that disgrace, the state
added the penalty of state imposed sanctions. In
such a society it was understandable that any
forced statements would of necessity require a pro-
tection against both infamy and criminality. Un-
fortunately, American courts interpreted immunity
statutes to include only the protection against crim-
inality.3 1 If the possibility of criminal penalties is
removed, then the fifth amendment no longer can
be invoked to prevent testimony.32
The requirement for a "criminal penalty" re-
ceived its first comprehensive treatment in Brown
by a school board as tantamount to a confession of guilt.
Id. at 559. Any other ruling would have allowed the
government to "coerce" a confession from the
witness-coercion by eliminating their livelihood. See
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967). This
same principle was later applied to attorneys in Spevack
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), where the Court noted
that, "no room in the privilege against self-incrimination
for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and
extend it to others" can be allowed. Id. at 516. Thus,
while the Court restricted the protection afforded by
grants of immunity to use and derivative use, it has
insured that the protection will extend across all proceed-
ings.
n' 8 J. WIGMORF § 2255 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1974).
3o See generally United States v. James, 60 F. 257, 263-65
(N.D. I1. 1894).
M' 8 J. WiGMORE § 2255 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1974).
Contra, Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 628 (1896) (Field,
J., dissenting); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
440 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v.
James, 60 F. 257 (1894) (Grosscup, Circuit Judge).
It should be noted that certain states retain the prac-
tice of allowing invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination for disgrace as well as criminality. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1205 (1933) ("[n]o party shall be
required to testify as to any matter which may ... tend
to bring infamy'); NEv. REv. STAr. § 48.130 (1967)
("[a] witness ... need not give an answer which will have
a direct tendency to ... degrade his character"); OR.
REV. Si-Ar. § 44.070 (1953) (a witness "need not give an
answer which will have a direct tendencyto ... degrade
his character.').
For a very fine compilation ofall the state laws dealing
with the self-incrimination privilege see 8 J. WIGMORE
§ 2252 n.3 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1974).
2 See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);




v. Walker. 3 Brown had refused to testify about
potential rate violations by the Allegheny Valley
Railway Company, despite a specific proviso in the
act that provided immunity to the witness from
subsequent criminal prosecution.3s The grand jury
reported the questions to the district court judge,
who fined Brown $5.00 and ordered him held in
contempt.3 5 Brown was refused habeas corpus relief
by the appellate court, and he subsequently ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. The Court refused
to overturn the district court's ruling.
3 6
In part, the Court noted that Brown's refusal to
testify had not been based on the failure of the
statute to protect him adequately from subsequent
criminal prosecution; rather, he had refused to tes-
tify because his testimony might have disgraced
him. 7 The Court argued that the result of allowing
such a plea to be sustained would emasculate the
criminal commerce statute. As the majority noted:
If... [Brown] were at liberty to set up an immunity
from testifying, the enforcement of the Interstate
Commerce law or other analogous acts, wherein it
is for the interest of both parties to conceal their
misdoings, would become impossible, iince it is only
from the mouths of those having knowledge of the
inhibited contracts that the facts can be ascer-
tained.s
33 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
3 Id. at 592-93. The questions posed by the grand jury
were:
Do you know whether or not the Allegheny Valley
Railway Company transported for the Union Coal
Company, during the months of July, August and
September, 1894, coal from any point on the Low
Grade division of said railroad company to Buffalo
at a less rate than the established rates in force
between the terminal points at the time of such
transportation? ...
Do you know whether the Allegheny Valley Rail-
way Company during the year 1894, paid to the
Union Coal Company any rebate, refund or com-
mission on coal transported by said railroad com-
pany from points on its Low Grade division to
Buffalo, whereby the Union Coal Company ob-
tained a transportation of such coal between the
said terminal points at a less rate than the open
tariff rate, or the rate established by said company?
If you have such knowledge, state the amount of
such rebates or drawbacks or commissions paid, to
whom paid, the date of the same, and on what
shipments; and state fully all the particulars within




36 d. at 610.
37 Id. at 609-10.38 Id. at 610.
The Court was clearly more concerned with en-
forcement of the law than it was with explaining
the origins of the fifth amendment privilege. In-
deed, the Court admitted that if the fifth amend-
ment were construed literally, a person could refuse
to testify when facts thereby disclosed tended "to
incriminate, disgrace or expose him to unfavorable
comments." 3 But, the majority accepted a less
than literal interpretation and acknowledged that
the "object of the provision" was "to secure the
witness against a criminal prosecution.' 40 The ma-
jority attempted no analysis of the fifth amend-
ment's historical basis.
The Brown Court appeared to accept, without
argument, that one who commits a criminal act
was not meant to be protected by the fifth amend-
ment beyond a protection from actual criminal
prosecution based on his testimony. The balance
to be struck was for disclosure of information. The
majority noted that:
[I]f the proposed testimony is material to the issue
on trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to
degrade the witness in public estimation does not
exempt him from the duty of disclosure. A person
who commits a criminal act is bound to contemplate
the consequences of exposure to his good name and
reputation, and ought not to call upon the courts to
protect that which he has himself esteemed to be of
such little value. The safety and welfare of an entire
community could not be put into the scale against
the reputation of a self-confessed criminal, who
ought not, either in justice or in good morals, to
refuse to disclose that which may be of great public




The reasoning of the Court appears to have been
based on a balancing of the public need to know
against the individual's right to remain silent. Yet,
no Court since Brown has suggested that the right
to remain silent is so tempered. The reasoning of
the Brown Court thus read like a well-written ad-
vocacy of law and order, but the opinion failed to
address or resolve the real issue-on what premise
the amendment is based. In sum, the invocation of
the "criminality" standard appeared to be the
result of a need to enforce the law rather than a
desire to interpret the fifth amendment.
Mr. Justice Field's dissent in Brown, on the other
hand, explained in detail the background of the
privilege against self-incrimination. First, he com-
pared the protections given by the fifth amend-
3
9 Id. at 595.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 605.
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ment to those afforded a person against defamation
at common law. At common law, a man's name
and standing in the community was far more
important than the imposition of a particular fine
or imprisonment. 2 The fact of legal criminality
was not as important as the fact of incrimination.
Field believed the fifth amendment to be an invo-
cation of humanity and policy, and hence thought
that the common law notions were incorporated
within the amendment. In this view, the result of
coercion of testimony is not only imprisonment but
disgrace as well.'
With regard to the majority's argument that
there should be a balance of society's need for the
testimony, Justice Field observed that such an
argument "ought not to have a feather's weight
against the abuses which would follow necessarily
the enforcement of criminating [sic] testimony."
According to Justice Field, "The Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States gives ab-
solute protection to a person called as a witness in
a criminal case against the compulsory enforce-
ment of any criminating testimony against him-
self.")4 5
In summary, Brown decided the question of
which subsequent proceedings were protected by
the fifth amendment. Though a person cannot be
forced to testify about a criminal act unless he is
granted immunity, he must testify if he is granted
immunity from criminal prosecution. The non-
criminal results of his testimony are not restricted
by the Brown interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment.
The Brown decision remained unchallenged until
1956, when Ullman v. United States46 was decided.
There, the Court was faced with the problem of a
witness who had refused to testify, under a grant
of immunity, about various communist activities.
47
The witness argued that his testimony would cause
certain severe disabilities, including possible loss of
employment, expulsion from labor unions, loss of
his passport, and general public disgrace.48 The
Court held that an immunity statute need only
remove those fears which justify an invocation of
the fifth amendment privilege-criminal prosecu-
tion.4" The Court declined to address the potential
42Id. at 636-37 (Field, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 637.
44 Id. at 635.
4 Id. at 630.
" Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).47 Id. at 423-25.
4 Id. at 430.
49 Id. at 431.
disabilities which might occur. Instead, it suggested
that the witness should attack the particular sanc-
tion after it is imposed on the basis that it was
"criminal in nature" and therefore protected by
the immunity grant.5" Noting that Brown v. Walker
had never been challenged as incorrect by subse-
quent courts, the majority refused to reconsider the
Brown decision.
5 1
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, wrote
a vitriolic dissent.52 First, Douglas noted that cer-
tain disabilities would be affixed to communist
party membership such as loss of a job, passport
revocation and dismissal from union posts.5 3 These
sacrifices by the testifying party, it was argued,
surely fell within the ambit of Boydv. United States.54
In Boyd, the Supreme Court had held that the fifth
amendment protected the party from turning over
certain documents in a forfeiture proceeding. In
effect, the Boyd Court said that such a proceeding
resulted in a criminal penalty by taking Boyd's
property.-
Like the forfeitures in Boyd, Douglas argued that
the inevitable results of Ullman's testimony would
be premised in what are essentially criminal acts.
While the government would not be charging Ull-
man with violation of a particular statute, the
conduct he would be testifying about would be
violative of a statute and the criminal nature of
that violation would lead to severe disabilities.
Douglas believed that the key element in Boyd and
in Ullman was the fact that a "criminal act" was
o Idt The exact words of the Court in acknowledging
that the sanction could be attacked were: "Here, since
the Immunity Act protects a witness who is compelled to
ansiver to the extent of his constitutional immunity, he
has of course, when a particular sanction is sought to be
imposed against him, the right to claim that it is criminal
in nature." Id.
It should be noted that the emphasis here is on "crim-
inal in nature." The Court has clearly allowed for invo-
cation of the fifth amendment in proceedings which are
non-criminal in intent but "criminal in nature." As will
be demonstrated later, lower federal and state courts
have failed to take cognizance of the potential that a
sanction designated as civil is in actuality "criminal."
s 350 U.S. at 436-39.52Id. at 440-55 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The scholarly
depth of the dissent is unquestionable. Indeed, one com-
mentator has suggested that future courts may well re-
consider Ullman given the persuasive and intellectual
excellence of this dissent. 1 DAVis, ADMINISTRA'rivE
LAw, § 3.08 (1958).
5 Justices Douglas and Black were quite ready to
overturn Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 350 U.S.
at 455.
54 350 U.S. at 440 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
"' 116 U.S. at 638.
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the base of the disability,+6 and he noted that
"[t]he forfeiture of property.on compelled testi-
mony is no more abhorrent than the forfeiture of
rights of citizenship. Any forfeiture of rights as a
result of compelled testimony is at war with the
Fifth Amendment. 5 7
Douglas also demonstrated that the purpose of
the fifth amendment would be lost if it only pro-
tected against criminal prosecution.58 According to
Douglas, the practical result of losing one's means
of support is as serious as criminal incarceration.
And, the practical result of having to testify about
a criminal act is that the witness loses the right to
freedom of conscience.59 While the majority had
suggested that the history of the fifth amendment
called for a less than literal interpretation of the
language,6° Douglas recognized that the majority
focused solely on history after the passage of the
amendment to limit the amendment's protection
to criminal prosecutions. 61  Apparently, the
"origins" of the amendment were quite different
from its "growth."' 2
The amendment, according to Douglas, was cre-
ated to protect the witness from prosecution and to
be a "safeguard of conscience and human dignity
and freedom of expression. '"' Recounting the hor-
rors of the Star Chambe" and High Commission as
well as the works of many scholars who studied the
fifth amendment's origin,64 Douglas concluded
that the history of the amendment clearly demon-
strated that it protected the witness from recount-
ing his own criminal acts.6 5 He reasoned that the
infamy and disgrace resulting to the accused were
-' 350 U.S. at 442 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5
'Id.
8 Id. at 445-55.
' If a person can be forced to testify about all manner
of disgraceful acts, he may conform his activities and
thoughts to the eventuality of a confession.
6 350 U.S. at 438-39.
61 Id. at 423-46. Justice Douglas made reference to the
absence of historical circumspection. Id. at 448-49 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
b2 The U/lman Court recognized this principle in quot-
ing Gompers v. United States:
The provisions of the Constitution are not mathe-
matical formulas having their essence in their form;
they are organic living institutions transplantcd
from English soil. Their significance is vital not
formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the
words and a dictionary, but by considering their
origin and the line of their growth.
350 U.S. at 438 n.14 (quoting Gompers v. United States,
233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914)).
6 350 U.S. at 45 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 446-53.
65 Id. at 449.
clearly punishment for criminal acts evinced by
society.62
Despite the dissenting statements in Brown and
U/man about the purposes and origins of the fifth
amendment, the doctrine that the amendment's
protection extends only to subsequent criminal
proceedings is now firmly implanted. The spectre
of personal disgrace and disability is not a consid-
eration which will justify a refusal to testify.
GRANTS OF IMMUNITY AND SUBSEQUENT
DISBARMENT
The result of the failure to extend the fifth
amendment's protection to non-criminal penalties
is vividly demonstrated in the repeated refusal of
the state and federal courts to overturn disbarments
of attorneys when those disbarments are based on
the attorney's own immunized testimony.6
The underpinnings of this result lie in the char-
acterization of disbarment proceedings as "civil."
6'
The removal of an attorney from the practice of
law is not a criminal proceeding, it is an action
taken to protect the integrity of the courts and the
interests of the general population. 2 As Judge
Cardozo observed:
To refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offenses. The examina-
tion into character, like the examination into learn-
ing, is merely a test of fitness. To strike the unworthy
lawyer from the roll is not to add to the pains and
penalties of crime. The examination into character
is renewed; and the test of fitness is no longer
satisfied.7
This examination into "fitness" is subject to the
full guarantees of due process but it is still not a
criminal proceeding.7i Concern for individual
66Id. at 451.67 See, e.g., In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d
889, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972).
8 Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 231 N.E.2d
718 (1967), cerl. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
69 For a discussion of the limits of the regulations that
may be imposed on attorneys consider Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See Note, 68J. CRIM. L.
& C. 624 (1977).
70 Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 176 N.E. 782, 783
(1917), cerl. denied. 24u U.6. 661 (1918) (Rouss had acted
as a go-between for money used to secure the absence of
a witness during the trial of his client).
71 The proceeding has been referred to, at most, as
"quasi-criminal." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968).
However, the burden of proof is different from the normal
criminal proceeding and the result is never imprisonment
or fines. The Supreme Court acknowledged that disbar-
ment was a "penalty" in In re Ruffalo, but only so far as
procedural due process rights such as notice, hearing, and
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rights, while an acknowledgment of the severity of
the proceeding, does not apparently evidence a
concern for the guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion.
The recent decision of In re Daley 2 reaffirmed
both the non-criminal character of disbarment pro-
ceedings and the Brown-Ullman line of immunity
cases. Despite contrary assurances from the district
court, the federal prosecutor and the Attorney
General prior to a witness giving testimony, the
Daley court held that a witness could still be dis-
barred for testimony he gave under a grant of
immunity.73 John Daley7 4 had given testimony as
the principal witness in an extortion and income
tax fraud case in exchange for a grant of immunity.
At the trial, Daley testified that he had passed
money to Charles Bonk in exchange for certain
zoning variances.75 The district court issued an
immunity order which commanded the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion not to use the testimony of Mr. Daley in any
bar disciplinary proceeding.76 After the trial of
specificity of charges are concerned. The case was not
unique in this regard as Schware v. Board of Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957), also stands for the proposition that
bar admission should be subject to due process guaran-
tees. See I DAvis, ADMINISTi'i'VE LAW § 7.18, at 494
(1958).
72 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), U.S. cert. denied.
73id. at 482. This decision may have very telling
implications on the entire immunity area of the law
because the Seventh Circuit held that the grant of im-
munity and promise not to prosecute by the federal
attorney can not go beyond the guarantee of"no criminal
prosecution." Any promise by the government to take
other action can be voided by a later court. This result
may well lead to a reduction in the number of persons
who will be willing to accept the immunity grant. Given
that the grant is often used as a bargaining tool by the
government with a potential defendant, the defendant
may, subsequent to In re Daley, choose to accept a
contempt citation and risk dismissal from the bar, rather
than testify about an illegal act virtually guaranteeing
dismissal from the legal profession. It is unclear whether
the federal attorneys would even attempt to seek a con-
tempt citation if the person refused to testify. The failure
to be able to persuade one member of the group of
criminals to testify might well end the entire prosecution,
and the contempt citation might not be worth the effort.
74 A side-light of this case is the fact that Mr. Daley is
a cousin of the late Chicago mayor, Richard J. Daley.
He was granted immunity in United States v. Bonk,
Crim. No. 75 C.R. 88 (N.D. Ill., June 6, 1975) (jury trial)
(not guilty) (indicted Feb. 13, 1975).15549 F.2d at 473.
76 The substance of the order stated that: "It is further
ordered that no testimony of the witness, John Daley,
compelled under this order as above may be used in any
administrative proceeding, disciplinary committee, any
Charles Bonk, the State of Illinois began a disci-
plinary proceeding against Daley, and he brought
an action in the federal district court to restrain
the Commission from using his testimony given
under the immunity grant.77 The district court
issued an order demanding that the state commis-
sion refrain from using the immunized testimony.78
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court
and authorized the Illinois Disciplinary Commis-
sion to use any and all prior testimony given by
Daley regardless of whether an immunity order
had been issued. The appellate court noted that
the scope of the immunity statute7' is limited to
that which the constitution requires, and the con-
stitution protects persons only in criminal proceed-
ings. The court suggested that a disciplinary pro-
ceeding was only a method "to protect the integrity
of the courts and to safeguard the interests of the
public by assuring the continued fitness of attor-
neys licensed by the jurisdiction,"' as opposed to
a criminal proceeding which was meant to "redress
criminal wrongs by imposing sentences of im-
prisonment, other types of detention or commit-
ment, or fines:"8' The court rejected the argument
that the information had been coerced from Daley,
because the immunity protection effectively re-
placed the fifth amendment by providing that no
criminal penalty could result. The court determined
that there could be no coercion, because the state
has a complete right to every man's testimony
within the boundaries of the fifth amendment.'
Only the constitutional guarantee against self-in-
crimination prevents the government from de-
manding testimony, thus the granting of immunity
"effectively removed the taint of criminality from
his testimony, as well as any valid reason for asser-
tion of the privilege.
' 'ss
In re Daley demonstrates two important tenden-
cies of the courts addressing disbarment. First, the
court implicitly adopted the reasoning of Ullman
s8
and Browns8 that fifth amendment protection ex-
bar association or state Supreme Court, in conjunction
with any professional disciplinary proceeding or disbar-
ment." In re John Daley, Grand Jury No. 71-3567 (N.D.
Ill., July, 1974), quoted at 549 F.2d at 473.
349 F.2d at 473.78 Id. at 474.
,9 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-03 (1970). See supra, note 3.
Id. at 475.
81 Id.
'2 Id. at 481. See, e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367
U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
83 549 F.2d at 481.
8'350 U.S. 422 (1956).
s 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
COMMENTS
tends only to criminal prosecutions.'s Secondly, the
court adopted the Cardozo position8 7 that bar dis-
ciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings.
The suggestion that bar proceedings are non-crim-
inal is essential to the findings of the various courts;
yet, it deserves much closer scrutiny when it is
applied to use of immunized testimony than it has
gotten thus far by the courts.
Dismissal of an attorney is "to protect the court
and public from the official ministrations of per-
sons unfit to practice." a Each state may set its own
standards for admission to the bar, and each state
undoubtedly requires certain intellectual and
moral standards be met.89 The Supreme Court has
placed few constitutional requirements on these
standards. Primarily, the standards must have a
"rational connection with the applicant's fitness or
capacity." 9° Procedural restrictions imposed by the
Court include notice, an opportunity to be heard
and judgment by a court of law.91 While the
proceeding must meet certain due process require-
ments, the Court has not defined the necessary
quantum of proof or the exact nature of the offenses
which will give rise to disbarment.
Spevack v. Klein,9 2 at first glance, appeared to
extend all the constitutional protections of a crim-
inal trial to disbarment proceedings. In Spevack an
attorney had been disbarred because he refused to
testify without a grant of immunity from future
criminal prosecution and the Court ordered his
reinstatement.9 3 The plurality' noted that "[I]n
this context 'penalty' is not restricted to fine or
imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, the imposition of any
86 See notes 32-66 supra and accompanying text.
8 See In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783
(1917).
" Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d, 878, 882. 544 P.2d
929, 933, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793, 797 (1976).
8"See In re Kunkle, 218 N.W.2d 521 (S.D.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1036 (1974); RULI.FS FOR ADMISSION 10 THF
BAR (V,'est 1975): Comment, Procedural Due Process and
Character Hearingsfor Bar Applicants, 15 STAN. L. R -. 500
(1963).
90 Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239
(1957).
9' In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
92 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
9 Id. at 519. The Spevack Court explicitly overturned
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). 385 U.S. at 514.
94Joining Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of the
Court's opinion, were Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Brennan. Mr. Justice Fortas wrote
a concurrence. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting
opinion joined by Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice
Stewart.
sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege costly."9 5 The Court then
ruled that an attorney could not be disbarred for
invoking the fifth amendment.6
Arguably, the attorney who testifies under a
grant of immunity is asserting his right to be
protected by the fifth amendment. If he is subse-
quently disbarred, the use of the fifth amendment
has been a hollow formality. Disbarment is swift
and sure to follow his testimony, and regardless of
the semantics, it will be viewed by him as punish-
ment.
State courts, however, have not accepted this
argument. In In re Terrell Schwarz,9 7 the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that an attorney could be
disbarred based on his immunized testimony be-
cause the proceeding was not criminal.9 8 The court
summarily dismissed Spevack, noting that the fifth
amendment had not been extended to cover all
portions of the disbarment proceeding in that de-
cision. Because the respondent attorney was not
being prosecuted criminally, he could not raise the
fifth amendment as a bar to the use of his testi-
mony.-
Similarly, in Committee on Legal Ethics of West
Virginia State Bar v. Graziani, the Supreme Court of
Appeals99 of West Virginia ruled that a grant of
immunity did not protect the witness' attorney
from subsequent disbarment. The court noted that
while disbarment proceeding was quasi-
criminal,' 1 it was not a "criminal proceeding"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.1°2 The
West Virginia court noted that it was not the fact
that these acts were criminal that was determina-
tive; rather, it was the fact that the acts complained
of involved moral turpitude.
9 9
However, while the proceeding itself may be
characterized as civil,"'0 that characterization is
95 385 U.S. at 515.
96Id. at 519.
97 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1047 (1972).
9 9 Id. at 338.
99 Id.
100 200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1972).
101 Id. at 355. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1966).
As the Court noted: "Disbarment, designed to protect
the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on a
lawyer.... He is accordingly entitled to procedural due
process which includes fair notice of the charge." Id. at
550.
'02 Graziani, 200 S.E.2d at 355.
'03 Id. at 357.
'04 Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 231 N.E.2d
718 (1967).
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not important'a 5 What is important is whether the
proceeding "is one which may result in sanctions
being imposed upon a person as a result of his
conduct being adjudged violative of the criminal
law." 1°6 While the general standard would seem to
allow the imposition of disbarment for immunized
testimony, this standard, as adopted in Daley and
other cases, fails to take into account the realities
of disbarment. It is the utmost in disgrace for the
attorney and eliminates his livelihood."° Disbar-
ment easily could be a more severe penalty than
the lengthiest imprisonment.' °8
The criminality should draw not from the pro-
ceeding, but from the punishment that is exacted.
Even Judge Sprecher, the author of the Daley opin-
ion, suggested that a criminal sanction is best
defined as something that is of "essence penal.""' 9
Several doctrines of punishment that are generally
recognized by the courts could be applied to argue
that a disbarment proceeding, based on immunized
testimony, is a criminal proceeding which should
be subject to fifth amendment prohibitions.
First, the imposition of disbarment is clearly the
imposition of an affirmative disability on the per-
son disbarred. The attorney's opportunities are
limited after disbarment. By being ordered never
to practice law, the disbarred attorney is, in effect,
The particular characterization of a proceeding as
civil or criminal is purely a matter of convenience. If the
result of a proceeding is criminal, then it will be treated
as a criminal proceeding. If the result of a proceeding is
civil, then it must be treated as a civil proceeding. Daley,
549 F.2d at 474. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
y'"Dale, 549 F.2d 474.
107The importance of respect by the public for the
legal profession is best noted in the "Code of Professional
Responsibility."
But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect
and confidence of the members of his profession and
of the society which he serves that should provide
to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible
degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that
respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY, Preamble (1975). Thus, even the Bar
Association itself acknowledges that disbarment is a most
severe penalty.
"a A comparable situation occurred in Campbell
Painting Corporation v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968), where
the Supreme Court affirmed its prior holdings that a
corporation had no fifth amendment privilege. Justice
Douglas, in dissent, noted that loss of financial livelihood
was as severe a restriction as any penalty. 392 U.S. at
291-92 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Clearly, if a direct im-
position of a fine for a criminal act would be considered
a penalty, then a removal of the right to make money
should be considered a penalty.
'09 549 F.2d at 475.
affirmatively restricted. The Supreme Court ap-
parently accepted this argument in Ex Parte Car-
lanadn There, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a post-Civil War oath imposed by some
states violated the presidential pardon of all Con-
federate soldiers. The oath required all attorneys
to declare that they had not served in the Confed-
eracy."' Refusal to take the oath resulted in dis-
barment for the attorney involved. In disallowing
such oaths, and in reinstating the attorney to the
bar, the Court concluded that, "exclusion from any
of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations
of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other
light than as punishment for such conduct.""' 2
Since the oath requirement and subsequent dis-
barment was punishment, it violated the presiden-
tial pardon. Similarly, in Spevack the removal of the
attorney for invoking his fifth amendment protec-
tion was characterized as a penalty.
1 13
To impose disbarment is, under the Garland rul-
ing, to impose an affirmative disability on the
attorney. Such a disability is a penalty, or could be
a penalty, and should therefore be protected by the
constitutional 'guarantees of the fifth amendment.
Also, the disciplinary action taken by the bar
association or state court is always taken pursuant
to a written code u1 4 and surely, the fifth amend-
ment did not contemplate the imposition of crim-
inal penalties only pursuant to criminal codes. On
the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
looked beyond the criminal codes to call something
a criminal punishment.115 For instance, in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez,"1 the Court listed at least seven
1104 Wall 333 (1866).
.. Id. at 381.
n2Id at 377. The Court also stated that, "to exclude
him [Garland], by reason of that offence, from continuing
in the enjoyment of a previously acquired right, is to
enforce a punishment for that offence not withstanding
the pardon." Id. at 381.
" 385 U.S. 511,515 (1967).
114 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1 (1975), provides, "A
lawyer should assist in maintaining the. integrity and
competence of the legal profession." The Disciplinary
Rules for the first Canon provide that, "DR 1-102 Mis-
conduct. A lawyer shall not:... (3) Engage in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude. (4) Engage in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation." It is through this canon and disciplinary rule
that violations of criminal statutes are punished in state
bar proceedings.
1 A fine compilation of the cases which have imputed
criminality to a proceeding otherwise considered civil is
given in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963).
n1 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
1978]
factors which might lead a reviewing court to
consider a certain action penal117 and these factors
included a question as to whether the sanction
imposed an affirmative disability. In a society with
multiple levels of government and a plethora of
enforcement agencies and statutes, the Court rec-
ognized that it would be unreasonable to suggest
that criminal penalties are meted out only by the
courts enforcing criminal codes. The disbarment
proceeding, by imposing an affirmative disability
on the attorney, is of essence .penal and should be
within the fifth amendment's protection."u
Secondly, the intent of the disciplinary codes
seems to fall within our general understanding of
deterrence. 9 Where the predominant intent is
deterrence, the discipline exacted can be character-
ized as a penalty.' 2° The clear intent of a discipli-
nary proceeding is not only to protect the courts
from this one person; it is also intended to deter
others from engaging in such conduct in the future.
For example, prior to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
1 21
a state ban on advertising acted as a continuing
restraint on attorneys in their day to day practice
of law. 2 2 The fact that any attorney who adver-
117 Id. at 168-69. That list included:
[1] Whether the sanction involved an affirmative
disability or restraint; [2] Whether it has historically
been regarded as punishment; [3] Whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter; [4] Whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence; [5]
Whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime; [61 Whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it; [7] Whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. at 168-69.
1'8 It is perhaps too obvious to take note of, but the
name of the proceeding is after all a "'disciplinary pro-
ceeding." Surely its intent is reflected in its name-to
mete out discipline.
"9See 372 U.S. at 168.
'20 For a consideration of the concept of deterrence see
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); F. ZIMRING
& G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973); van den Haag, In
Defense of the Death Penalty: a Legal-Practical-Moral Analysis,
14 GRIm. L. Bul.L. 51, 59 (1978). For a discussion of
economic factors and deterrence consider Comment,
Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. GRIM. L. &
C. 40, 44-47 (1978).
12' 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
122 ABA, CODE OF PROFE-SSIONAi. RESPONSIBII.ITY,
Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (A)(1975). The ban on advertis-
ing was applicable to every attorney member of the ABA.
The effectiveness of the ban as a deterrent to advertising
was clearly implied in the invalidation of the Code
provision by the Supreme Gourt. The provision had
effectively cut-off advertising of fees and services for the
general public. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977).
tised might have been penalized by the state bar
association surely had something to do with the
deterrence. Continued obedience to the Code of
Professional Responsibility is at least in part due
to attorney awareness of the potential sanctions.
Again, while the label may suggest that a bar
disciplinary proceeding is "civil," the realities sug-
gest that it is much more. Its impact is to deter
conduct, and it therefore can be considered a pen-
alty.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the
sanctions which are imposed on attorneys subse-
quent to their giving immunized testimony are
sanctions imposed for violations of the criminal
law. In Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Sugar-
man,
12
3 the appellant was disciplined for his partic-
ipation in a scheme to avoid federal income taxes.
The scheme was clearly a violation of federal law.
12
4
In Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar
v. Graziani,'2 5 the appellant was specifically accused
of conspiring to give a bribe. That offense would,
again, have been a violation of the federal criminal
law.'22 In In re Schwarz,127 the petitioner had also
given bribes which would have violated federal
anti-bribery statutes.'22 Finally, in In re Daley'22 the
petitioner faced charges regarding his criminal con-
duct in acting as the go-between for passing bribe
money to the judge.1 3° Thus, even if one suggests
that the disbarment proceeding is not created to
enforce the criminal law, the result is that it does
enforce it. The attorney is directly punished for his
participation in a criminal act. The court system
may not be looking to the criminal code in order
to disbar the attorney, but it is nevertheless impos-
ing a penalty for a criminal act.
The courts have argued that the person is not
disbarred because the act is criminal; rather, he is
disbarred because the act is indicative of bad char-
acter. 3 1 Of course, the action indicates "bad char-
acter," otherwise it would not be a criminal viola-
tion, but the criminal codes also penalize "bad
character." The salient feature of both the discipli-
nary proceeding based on immunized testimony
1,2 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974).
124 Id. at 2. See 26 U.S.G. § 7201 (1970), "Attempt to
Evade or Defeat Tax."
1'2 200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. Gt. App.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1972).
126 Id. at 354. 18 U.S.G. § 201 (1970).
-12 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689 (1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1047 (1973).
28 Id. at 335-36. 18 U.S.C. § 201.
'29 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977).
130 Id. at 473. 18 U.S.G. § 201.
"
1 See. e.g., In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782
(1917).
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and the criminal court proceeding, is the recogni-
tion that certain actions violate a written standard
of conduct and are thus criminal. In emphasizing
the purpose of beginning the action against the
attorney, the courts have misapplied the law of
punishment. The result of the disciplinary proceed-
ing is the enforcement of a criminal law through a
bar sanction. Such an action should be interpreted
as nothing less than a criminal penalty.
If one can show that the action taken is tanta-
mount to a criminal penalty, then there is not
justification for a court refusing to apply fifth
amendment protections to the proceeding which
can lead to those sanctions. While it may be lau-
datory to protect the courts from the taint of
allowing admitted criminals to practice law,'32 the
expansion of the principles set down in cases such
as In re Daley are frightening. A prosecutor bent on
attacking someone could force that person to testify
under a grant of immunity for an act which could
not otherwise be proven.1 3 3 That person might
subsequently be spared a jail term, but lose his
reputation and livelihood.
POTENTIAL ABUSE: LICENSURE AND STATE
CONTRACTING
The limitless use of immunized testimony out-
side the criminal courts may have far-reaching
consequences. States have authority to issue licen-
ses to nearly all professions, and the disclosure of
criminal involvement may result in termination of
that license. From barbers to doctors, state licen-
sure can be a prerequisite to work. 34 New York
132 It is quite possible that there are other methods for
proving attorney misconduct. A more vigorous policing
of the legal profession is surely possible, along with a
greater concern for the competency of those practicing.
Perhaps it would be possible to build a case without the
immunized testimony in the same fashion that a criminal
court must look at evidence not derived from the immu-
nized testimony. This approach, requiring the same stan-
dard for criminal court and disciplinary actions, would
not entirely preclude disciplinary action, it would only
require greater diligence on the part of the Bar Associa-
tions. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 461-62.
13 In essence the prosecutor can make this a short cut
for a full investigation. If he can force the testimony of a
co-conspirator, while knowing that the co-conspirator
will be severely punished by disbarment, then his choice
will be clear cut. As noted earlier, see note 3 supra, the
power of the prosecutor to grant immunity is virtually
without limit.
"4 A state is not given complete leeway as to what it
can and can not license. It is generally accepted that a
state may not, for instance, license "common" occupa-
tions. See Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 268, 183 A. 534,
539 (1936). See also Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). Though it is difficult to set
alone licenses over three hundred occupations.135 A
survey of state codes shows that there are more
than four thousand separate statutory provisions
on occupational licensure. l os Indeed, more and
more professions are being licensed every year as
lobbyists for these professions attempt to protect
their area of expertise from possible encroach-
ment.
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Recently, a court allowed the introduction of
immunized testimony in an action to remove the
registration certificate of an engineer.Iss The court
noted in that case that immunity was not meant to
go beyond criminal proceedings, and the licensure
of an engineer was not such a criminal inquiry.
3 9
The analysis is clearly parallel to the analysis given
the disbarment cases discussed earlier, 4° and there
is no reason to believe that it could not be extended
to cover all types of licensure proceedings.
There is a possibility that a licensure proceeding
which attempts to use immunized testimony to
establish criminality could be challenged for failure
to show a need even to investigate or consider such
conduct. As one court has stated, "[S]tandards for
excluding persons from engaging in such commer-
cial activities must bear some reasonable relation
to their qualifications to engage in those activi-
ties."'' For instance, a taxi license cannot be de-
nied simply because of a disorderly conduct con-
down a precise definition of "common" occupation, the
most general criteria is that the occupation not involve a
"threat to the public welfare." Dasch v. Jackson, 170
Md. 251, 268, 183 A. 534, 539 (1936).
' N.Y. CONSOLIDAFED LAws (McKinney 1955)
"Master Index D-L."
6 Stacy, Limitations on Denying Licensure to Ex-Offenders,
2 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1973).
1
37 W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOV-
ERNMENTAl. RESTRAINTS 109 (1956).
" Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md. 1976).
'3 Id. at 434.
140 See notes 72-109 supra and accompanying text.
14 Perrine v. Municipal Court, 488 P.2d 648, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1971). The similarity between the licensure
test and the fourteenth amendment equal protection test
is striking. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974), the Court stated, "We deal with economic and
social legislation where legislatures have historically
drawn lines which we respect against the charge of
violation of the Equal Protection Clause ifthe law be
'reasonable, not arbitrary ... ' and bears 'a rational
relationship to a [permissible] state objective.'" Id. at 8.
To the same effect is Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1970). In Graham, the Supreme Court ordered states
to provide aid to resident aliens who qualified under
welfare laws. The Court stated, "Under traditional equal
protection principles, a State retains broad discretion to
classify as long as its classification has a reasonable basis
..... Id. at 371.
viction during a campus socialist rally.1 42 A Cali-
fornia court overturned the refusal of a state to
license a bookseller based on his criminal record.1
43
The problem with applying this general argu-
ment to the use of immunized testimony is, of
course, that the admission by the witness that he
has committed a criminal act is an admission of
bad character. No court has yet said that moral
character is never a legitimate criteria on which to
deny or revoke a license. The general proposition
that a state may examine moral character of ap-
plicants for licensure apparently goes unquestioned
as to many licensed professions.'"
There appears to be no barrier to the use of
immunized testimony in any and all licensure pro-
ceedings. As long as those bodies may consider
moral character in their licensure decisions, and as
long as a penalty is not discerned from the pro-
ceeding, the states will be able to utilize otherwise
immunized testimony.
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Another area of state control is the right to select
contractors for state projects. The right to contract
with the government can be put in serious jeopardy
when an officer of a corporation testifies under a
grant of immunity. In nearly every statute author-
izing competitive bidding, there are words to the
effect that the bid should go to the "lowest respon-
sible bidder.', 146 "Responsible" is defined as "going
112 Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204
A.2d 521 (1964).
'4 Perrine v. Municipal Court, 488 P.2d 648, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1971).
" This general proposition draws its precedent from
the 1898 case of Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189
(1898). In that case the state denied a license to a doctor
who had performed an abortion in 1878. He served a
sentence of ten years in jail. In 1895 the state passed a
law which made it illegal for anyone to practice medicine
who had been convicted of a felony, and Dr. Hawker was
fined for violating this prohibition. The Supreme Court
upheld his conviction viewing the regulation as "prescrib-
ing the qualifications" for the practice of medicine-not
a penalty. Id. at 200. As the Court said, "It is not open to
doubt that the commission of crime, the violation of the
penal laws of a State, has some relation to the question
of character." Id. at 196. This automatic disqualification
from the practice of medicine was considered a legitimate
exercise of the state's power to protect the public health
and welfare.
Recently, a few courts have questioned this absolute
bar to ex-felons. Conviction of an offense, according to
these courts, must bear some relation to the profession
that is being considered. Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau,
236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964).
145 See notes 72-109 supra and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., 24 ILL. REv. SrA'r. § 9-2-105 (West 1961).
Federal contractors may also be disqualified from bid-
ding, for "cause." 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-1(2) (1976).
to the skill, judgment, and integrity"' 147 and in
Illinois a contractor must be "by experience and
otherwise, capable of doing the work in a satisfac-
tory manner.' 48 Defining "satisfactory" and "in-
tegrity" is a task left to the discretion of the gov-
ernmental unit involved. Surely those terms could
be used to connote an absence from criminal activ-
ity.
49
In Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v. Kohl,' 50 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld the disqualification of
a corporation from state contracting when it was
disclosed that a corporate officer had been indicted
for bribery. The indicated officer had not been
convicted, nor was he the sole owner of Trap Rock
Industries, Inc. 15 ' The court, however, agreed that
even the appearance of a criminal doing work for
the state was considered detrimental enough to
allow the disqualification. 52 The bidders' interests,
it was alleged, are always subordinate to those of
the state.15s The fact that this corporate officer was
not the sole owner of the corporation was deemed
irrelevant because the integrity of the officers and
the corporation were, in the court's view, virtually
inseparable. As the court noted, "the moral respon-
sibility of a corporation is one and same with the
moral responsibility of the individuals who give it
direction. ' ' Further, with regard to the relevancy
of a criminal violation, the New Jersey court noted:
It is settled that the legislative mandate that a
bidder be "responsible" embraces moral integrity
just as surely as it embraces a capacity to supply
labor and materials .... The relevancy of moral
responsibility is evident. It heads off the risk of
collusive bidding. It assures honest performance. It
meets the citizen's expectation that his government
will do business only with men of integrity.1ss
While no cases have extended the Trap Rock
rationale to an instance where immunized testi-
mony is used to show criminal activity, the premise
seems to carry over to those cases. If the immunized
147 J.N. Futia Co. v. Office of General Services, 39
App. Div. 2d 136, 137, 332 N.Y.S.2d 261, 263 (1972).
"4 Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 Ill. App. 443,449,
28 N.E.2d 748, 751 (1940).
' Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471,284
A.2d 161 (1971). See also Comment, Criminal Sanctions for
Corporate Illegality, 69J. CRiM. L. & C. 40, 55 (1978).
50 59 N.J. 471, 284 A.2d 161 (1971).
Id. at 476, 284 A.2d at 163-64.
152 Id. at 487, 284 A.2d at 170.
13 Id. at 481, 284 A.2d at 166.
1'4 Id. at 482, 284 A.2d at 166-67.
5 Id. at 482, 284 A.2d at 166.
COMMENTS [Vol. 69
IMMUNITY AND SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL PUNISHMENT
testimony demonstrates an involvement in criminal
activity, then the same considerations of "integ-
rity" would attach.
In Lejkowitz v. Turley,"56 the Supreme Court held
that the New York laws disqualifying contractors
whose officers refused to waive their fifth amend-
ment rights, in effect "coerced" the contractors into
speaking out. 5 7 The court held that the statement
taken could not be introduced against the witness
at a subsequent criminal proceeding.158 The ability
of a state to treat a corporation and its officers
differently derives from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Campbell Painting Corporation v. Reid." 9 There,
the Court reasoned that the fifth amendment could
not be invoked to protect a corporation. 160 A con-
tractor had been barred from state jobs after he
refused to waive his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' 6' The Court refused to
consider the immense monetary loss that could
result to the contractor from the disqualification to
bid state jobs. That monetary loss could, of course,
be just as severe a penalty for invocation of the
fifth amendment as the direct loss of a job. The
dissent argued quite strongly that such an imposi-
tion by the state was indeed a penalty.'6 As with
disbarment, a consideration of whether the action
taken is a penalty could result in a serious challenge
to any disqualification based on immunized testi-
mony.
16 3
Recently, the State of Illinois has explicitly
stated that persons who are granted immunity may
have that immunized testimony used against them
in a disqualification action by the state." No
challenge has yet been made of that statute, and
given the Daley decision's'6 5 clear statement that a
federal immunity grant can not bind a state pro-
ceeding,'6 it seems unlikely that such a challenge
would succeed in the Seventh Circuit. This explicit
1'6 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
157 Id. at 82-83.
'5Id at 85.
'0 392 U.S. 286 (1968).
'60 Id. at 288-89.
'Id. at 287-88.
162 Id. at 289-92 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Lef-
kowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973) where the Court
acknowledged that loss of state contracts acted to coerce
a confession from an architect.
163 See notes 110-33 supra and accompanying text.
'r4 Chicago Sun Times, Sept. 14, 1977, at 18, col. 1. In
addition, the federal government has begun to exclude
contractors convicted of bid rigging. Chicago Tribune, Feb.
6, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
"r3 Daley, 549 F.2d 469.
,66 Id. at 482.
statement of policy by the State of Illinois, however,
clearly indicates that the action is not taken to
guarantee an efficient and honest contractor.
Rather, it is taken to punish the otherwise unpun-
ished offender. 167 Such an explicit state policy
might well lead to a crystallization of the real issue
behind the use of immunized testimony-whether
the use by a non-criminal agency is in effect pun-
ishment for a criminal act.16 Ironically, the candor
of the Illinois law may well prove its downfall.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination now extends only to
criminal proceedings. The Brown decision and its
progeny leave little doubt as to the law's applica-
tion to the criminal process. However, the actions
taken by agencies against an immunized witness
appear to be misuse of the constitutional doctrine.
The actions taken based on immunized testimony
often are no less than a criminal prosecution in the
guise of an administrative hearing.
Even accepting the position of the Court with
regard to the need to show a "criminal penalty,"
the expansion by lower courts allowing the use of
immunized testimony seems unwarranted. Disbar-
ment and other disciplinary actions by state bar
associations fall within the accepted doctrines of
penalties, and the courts should acknowledge that
a penalty can be a criminal penalty even when
generally intended to meet problems other than
those addressed by the criminal law. This is espe-
cially true when one considers that several of the
disbarment/immunized testimony cases involved
criminal offenses.' 69 Regardless of the underlying
motivation, the result of disciplinary proceedings
is often the enforcement of the criminal law.
The potential for continuing expansion of the
use of immunized testimony exists in many other
areas outside the courts. Both state licensure and
contracting could utilize immunized testimony to
the detriment of the immunized witness. These
areas pose the same problems in determining what
constitutes a penalty as does the disbarment pro-
ceeding. The abuse of the fifth amendment guar-
"36 The author of the Illinois bill has stated, "Just
because the federal government gives immunity doesn't
mean that the state government has to give it." Chicago
Sun Times, Sept. 14, 1977, at 18, col. 5.
6s5 This is, of course, the key element in determining
the extent of fifth amendment protection. 549 F.2d at
474-75.
'0 See notes 123-30 supra and accompanying text.
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antee was predicted in the 1800's, and the words of meant to extend to all the consequences of disclo-
one judge as to the protections of the fifth amend- sure.170
IUaIL pear to be tue evei today:
The oppression of crowns and principalities is un-
questionably over, but the more frightful oppression
of selfish, ruthless and merciless majorities may yet
constitute one of the chapters of future history. In
my opinion, the privilege against a criminal accu-
sation, guaranteed by the fifth amendment, was
At the very least, it is time that the Supreme Court
consider the current impact of Brown and Ullman
on the unlimited use of immunized testimony by
administrative agencies.
JAMES R. TROUPIS
170 United States v. James, 60 F. 257, 265 (N.D. Ill.
1894).
